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TC 11002a-65
Copy 4 of 6
3 November 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Briefing on Strategic Weapons Intelligence
Panel (SWIP)

1. I have attached for your information a summary of events surrounding the briefing on Soviet aircraft given to the Director's Strategic Weapons Intelligence Panel (SWIP Panel). A recommendation is contained in paragraph 3.

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2. Very briefly, the attached paper makes the following points:

a. Despite the fact that OIR has primary responsibility within the Agency for research on the deployment and operational use of Soviet aircraft, OHI was assigned responsibility for presenting the briefing on this subject to the SWIP Panel on 9 September. Until we pressed OHI we were not even shown the briefing material. When we finally had a chance to review the draft, we made a number of changes but we found on the day of the briefing that most of our suggestions had not been accepted.

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b. During the briefing a number of errors were made which had to be corrected by the OIR observer. It was clear to the Panel that the briefer did not have a very thorough understanding of the subject.

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c. The Panel had been told by DD/S&T that the intelligence community was not aware of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] was very upset when he learned that he had been misinformed and, as a consequence, OHI, working with OCI, was asked to prepare for the Director a history of our intelligence on this subject. As you may remember, this paper outlined in detail a number of OIR reports dating from 1962 on the progress of [REDACTED]

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d. Because of the Panel's intense interest in the use of Soviet airframe plants, the available floor space and the capacity to accommodate the production of heavy and medium bomber aircraft, [REDACTED] of ORR was obliged to prepare a one-hour briefing on this subject with only one day's notice -- a briefing, I might add, for which he was highly complimented.

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3. It seems to me that, when the Agency is making an effort to draw on some of the best brains in the country on a subject of this kind and at the same time is trying to build its prestige with these people, we should put our best foot forward. I recognize that the [REDACTED] Panel has been pretty much of a ID/S&T show but they are after all running it on behalf of the Director. It is my recommendation that, in the future, on briefings of this and similar high-level panels on subjects for which ORR has the primary responsibility within the Agency the briefing be assigned to ORR. To take it out of its parochial context, I think that on most high-level, technical briefings of this kind the Agency should use its best available talent. If you can accept this as a general proposition, recognizing that there will certainly be exceptions, we will let you know in those cases when your support is needed. Needless to say, we will do our best to handle such situations as smoothly as possible and with a minimum of bickering.

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Acting Director
Research and Reports

Enclosure:

Memorandum from Chief, F/AS to AD/ORR,
on same subject, dated 22 October 1965

Distribution:

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OD/ORR [REDACTED] Jr: gkg/5001 (3 Nov 65)

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